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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MACARIO ARELLANO, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
~ 
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
Case No. 
8486 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts as related in Appellant's brief are so selected 
that we believe a complete restatement is necessary in order 
to fairly present Respondent's position. 
Appellant alleged in his complaint that he was injured 
on the 31st day of March, 1954, at Dumphy, Nevada, and 
that his injury was caused by the negligence of the Rail-
road in the following particulars: 
1. The defendant ordered him to perform dangerous 
and unsafe acts when it knew or should have known that 
there were safer methods of performing the work. 
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2. The Railroad failed to provide plaintiff with proper 
tools. 
3. The Railroad failed to provide plaintiff with a safe 
place to work. 
Following a pretrial, the trial judge made a pretrial 
order in which he stated the following: 
"1. The grounds on which the plaintiff contends that 
the defendant was negligent are limited to the following: 
"a. That the defendant did not furnish the plaintiff 
with the proper tools and equipment for the work he was 
ordered to do. 
"b. That the defendant did not furnish the plaintiff 
a safe place in which to work." 
The evidence can be simplified by stating those things 
which are undisputed. It is clear that plaintiff fell while 
the section crew on which he was working was unloading 
riprap from the railroad track into the adjoining culvert. 
The dispute which arises concerns whether he slipped and 
fell into the culvert, as testified by Mr. Charlevois, or 
whether he was knocked into the culvert by rolling stones 
after he had dislodged one or more of the stones on direct 
order from Charlevois. 
The testimony of Charlevois is simple and in substance 
is as follows: While the rocks were being removed, he 
observed the plaintiff to be unsteady on his feet and "told 
him to get out of the way before he got hurt." He intended 
that the plaintiff would step off of the rocks so that the 
others could move them out of the way. "Instead of getting 
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out of the way the man walked out on the edge of the fill 
* * * on the edge of the pile of the rock there, and 
he stumbled * * * and turned almost completely around, 
and fell down into the ditch * * *" (R. 140). 
At the time plaintiff slipped he was not engaged in 
the process of attempting to move a rock or rocks (R. 140). 
At no time did Charlevois observe him attempting to move 
any rocks (R. 141). Charlevois further stated that he at 
no time instructed "Mr. Arellano to get down and move or 
dislodge a rock" (R. 141). 
Arellano's version of what occurred is not so simple. 
In fairness to him it should be pointed out that the testi-
mony which he gave came through an interpreter. His 
testimony, as so elicited, was in substance as follows: After 
the riprap was dumped from the flat car the roadmaster 
told "the rest of us * * * to roll the stones" (R. 19). 
He, with the others, thereupon "began to roll the stones." 
He was rolling the stones with a bar which the roadmaster 
told him to use (R. 22). While he was rolling the stones 
he dislodged one and another one rolled and hit him in the 
back and knocked him into the culvert. The spot where he 
was located when the stone struck him is near the edge of 
the culvert toward the east, as shown on Exhibit 3. 
Later at page 24 of the record, he said : "The road-
master made the sign, the motion to me, with his hand, to 
keep on rolling the stones. I laid my bar down, because one 
of the stones would not be rolled, so I seized it with my 
hands to pull it; when I pulled it with my hand, the other 
one became dislodged and hit me." Again at page 25, he 
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4 
sa~d that he moved to the outer edge of the riprap when 
,' I' .. 
the roadmaster told him to roll the stones and that he moved 
to this position when the roadmaster said· "roll them." 
Following this testimony, counsel for the plaintiff 
withdrew the plaintiff from the stand and called another 
witness. When the plaintiff returned to the stand, he was 
again asked about moving the stones and stated that he 
rolled rocks at the top of the pile for about twenty minutes 
and that then the roadmaster motioned to him to keep push-
ing the stones (R. 44). He again reiterated that the reason 
he moved from the top of the pile to the bottom of the pile 
in a place which he thought was in the clear was "because 
the roadmaster said to roll the stones." 
After the evening recess the plaintiff was again re-
called to the stand and in answer to his counsel's questions, 
"rehashed" the whole incident and made significant changes 
in his testimony. Instead of the roadmaster telling him to 
"roll the stones," as he had testified on the previous day, 
the plaintiff said that he left the top of the pile because the 
roadmaster "told me to remove a stone that was blocking 
it" (R. 99). 
The only other person present who was called as a 
witness was an Indian by the nan1e of Jerry Jackson. He 
was one of the section crew moving the rocks at the time the 
plaintiff was injured. He did not see the plaintiff fall but 
heard somebody say "somebody going to fall." At that time 
the plaintiff was near the east end of the culvert (R. 125-
126). 
At the conclusion of the testimony the jury returned 
a ve,rdict in favor of the railroad "No cause of action." 
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5. 
Thereafter, the Appellant made a motion for new trial, 
which was denied, and it is from this judgment and order 
that Appellant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TION NO. 12. 
II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3. 
III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPE.LLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2. 
IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
SPECIFICALLY INST:RUCT, AS REQUESTED 
BY APPELLANT, THAT AN EMPLOYER IS 
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IF IT EXPOSES 
ITS EMPLOYEE TO AN UNNECESSARY RISK, 
AND THAT SUCH DUTY CANNOT BE DELE-
GATED. 
v. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT, AS REQUESTED 
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BY APPELLANT, THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID 
NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF HIS EMPLOY-
MENT AND T'HAT HE WAS NOT NEGLIGENT 
IN CONTINUING TO WORK KNOWING THAT 
HE WAS REQUIRED TO WORK IN A DAN-
GEROUS OR UNSAFE PLACE. 
VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS NOS. 13 AND 14. 
VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL BY 
REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF A JUROR. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TION NO. 12. 
We do not quarrel with Appellant's general proposition 
that a party is entitled to have the court instruct on its 
theory of the case. This, however, does not establish that 
Instruction No. 12 is erroneous. 
Plaintiff's theory of the case, as stated in the pretrial 
order, was failure of the defendant to provide a safe place 
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to work and failure to provide plaintiff with proper tools. 
During the trial, plaintiff and only plaintiff, testified that 
immediately prior to the time he was injured he was in the 
act of loosening a stone which he had been directed to move 
by defendant's roadmaster. If this. was so and if the de-
fendant vvas negligent in requiring plaintiff to perform this 
task, then defendant failed to furnish plaintiff a safe place 
to work. Instruction No. 12 is directed to this point and 
instructs the jury that before the defendant can be held 
responsible for plaintiff's injuries by reason of the plain-
tiff's act of loosening the stone, the jury must find that 
the defendant knew or should have known that the removal 
would expose plaintiff to unreasonable risk of harm. 
Failure to give such an instruction would have left 
the jury free to find that defendant was liable if the plain-
tiff was removing a stone immediately prior to the time 
he fell, without regard to whether or not defendant was 
negligent. Inasmuch as there was a sharp dispute and some 
emphasis placed on this issue, the jury could have believed 
that all they need have found was this fact. The instruc-
tion was therefore necessary to properly present to the jury 
the I a w applicable to the evidence in the case. 
Appellant does not claim that Instruction No. 12 is 
not a correct statement of the law nor does Appellant cite 
any law which would sustain him in such a contention. It 
is difficult to understand what Appellant does claim. As 
near as \Ve can determine, the instruction is objected to 
because it does not contain all other theories which Appel-
lant now claims are applicable to the issues in this case. 
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In Bowden v. D. & R. G. Western Railroad Company, 
3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240, the Utah Supreme Court sus-
tained an instruction given by the lower court which in 
substance and effect was similar to Instruction No. 12, 
particularly with reference to the necessity of finding that 
the defendant railroad knew or should have known that a 
condition was unsafe before it could be held negligent. The 
instruction was as follows : 
"In order to find that the railroad was negligent 
in failing to provide a safe place to work in this 
case, you must find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that · · 
" ( 1) The railroad knew, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have known that there was 
snow or other substance near the tracks at the point 
of the accident, which snow or substance created a 
situation which was not a reasonably safe place for 
railroad workers to work ; * * * " 
II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPE.LLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3. 
Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 3 is as follows: 
"You are instructed that the defendant had a 
statutory duty to provide its employees, including 
the plaintiff, with a safe place in which to work. 
This duty on the part of the defendant includes 
within its n1eaning the duty to provide its e1nployees 
a reasonably safe manner and place for doing the 
work, and it is required to exercise reasonable care 
to provide such a plan. If the defendant failed to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
exercise reasonable care to provide a reasonably 
safe manner and place to do the work requited by 
it, then defendant is guilty of negligence." 
In support of its contention, Appellant cites the follow-
ing cases: 
In Fisher v. Minn and S. L. Railroad Company, 199 
F. 2d 308, the court held that plaintiff's husband, who 
was killed when he cut poles. loose from a loaded rail-
road car, could not recover because his own negligence 
in performing the work was, as a matter of law, the 
sole proximate cause of his death. The safe rnethod re-
ferred to in the quotes at page 17 of Appellant's brief ap-
plies to the deceased's conduct which the court held as a 
matter of law was negligent. 
In Jefferson v. City of Raleigh, North Carolina, 140 
S. E. 76, 194 N. C. 479 (1927), there is very little reference 
to the facts in the case. Apparently it involved the question 
of whether or not the defendant was negligent in failing 
to provide the plaintiff with goggles and the failure to 
provide a shield or hood on a machine involved. The court 
submitted the issue to the jury, saying: 
"It was the duty of the defendant in the exer-
cise of ordinary care to provide its servants and em-
ployees with reasonably safe places and safe tools 
and appliances to work with, and to provide them 
with reasonably safe methods and means to do the 
work for which they are employed and in which they 
are engaged." 
We fail to see how these facts in any way relate to the 
facts in the instant case, or to Instruction No. 3. 
In A. T. & S. F. Railroad Company v. Struder, 213 F. 
2d 250, the court simply held that it was a jury question as 
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to whether or not it was negligent to provide a refrigerator 
car for hauling long lengths of galvanized pipe instead of 
a car from which the pipe could be more easily unloaded. 
There were no instructions involved. The case is of no help 
in this situation. 
In Cahn v. S. P. Company, 282 P. 2d 78, 132 Cal. App. 
410, plaintiff allegedly sustained an eye injury when a 
heavy coupler fell from a pile of couplers onto the cement 
where he was working causing a particle of cement to strike 
his eye, dislodging the retina. The court did not discuss 
instructions but merely held that from such evidence the 
jury could find the railroad negligent in failing to provide 
plaintiff with a safe place to work. 
In Joy v. Pope, 53 P. 2d 683, 175 Okla. 540, and in Enid 
Transfer and Storage Co1npany v. Mollenhauer, 251 P. 2d 
1068, 207 Okla. 654, neither the facts nor the law are analo-
gous or helpful in the instant case. In the Pope case, the 
allegation of the complaint \vas as follows: 
" 'Plaintiff alleges that the machinery and ap-
pliances hereinabove described and the construction 
and operation thereof, in the manner herein alleged, 
was highly dangerous, and 'vhich danger was not 
known to plaintiff's decedent, and could not by the 
exercise of ordinary care have been ascertained by 
him * * * and said defendant \Yas guilty and 
negligent in the Inaintenance and operation of the 
machinery and appliances as herein alleged; that 
the construction and operation of such machinery 
and appliances, in the method and manner herein 
alleged, constituted the same highly dangerous, and 
said defendant wholly failed in its duty to plaintiff's 
decedent as hereinabove set out.' " 
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In the Enid case supra the plaintiffs plead failure to 
furnish: (1) A safe place to work. (2) A safe method to 
do the work. (3) Safe tools. (4) Competent and safe co-
workers. 
The court in sustaining a verdict returned for the plain-
tiff in the lower court did not consider instructions, but only 
considered the question of whether there was sufficient 
evidence to take the case to the jury. The most the two 
foregoing cases contribute are generalities with which we 
do not disagree, such as stated in the Enid case as follows: 
"The duty of furnishing a reasonably safe place 
in which to work, reasonably safe appliances with 
which to perform the work, and reasonably careful, 
prudent, and competent fellow servants, 1s a non-
delegable duty of the employer." 
In August v. Texas and N. 0. R. Co., 265 S. W. 2d 148, 
(Texas Appellate), the trial court directed a verdict for 
the defendant. The Texas Appellate Court sustained. There 
was no discussion in the case regarding instructions. The 
court simply held, as quoted in plaintiff's brief, that the 
Railroad had a duty to provide a reasonably safe place and 
method of doing work. We find nothing in this case with 
which we can disagree. 
In Millett v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 146 Atl. 903, 128 Me. 
316, the plaintiff was injured by a flying spark while work-
ing near a field fire. His job was. to keep the fire from 
spreading. At the time of injury he was walking near the 
fire with a bucket of water and broom. The plaintiff 
claimed this was a negligent method of doing the work. 
The lower court, however, could find no evidence of negli-
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gence and refused to permit the case to go to the jury. The 
Maine Court in sustaining the action of the lower court 
said at page 904: 
"Plaintiff had the burden to adduce reasonable 
evidence which would tend to show, primarily, a 
breach of duty owed to him in respect to the method 
of doing the work. Negligence may not be found 
from the mere happening of an accident. 
* * * * 
"There is no evidence that the method employed 
was not common and usual in the occupation." 
There was no evidence in the instant case that defen-
dant failed to supply plaintiff with a reasonable safe place 
to work or n1ethod of working except as testified by plain-
tiff. The action which he outlined related to place of work. 
This situation was completely covered by the court's in-
structions, particularly Instruction No. 12. Any further 
instruction on method of work would not have assisted the 
jury. Particularly is this so considering Appellant's failure 
to introduce any evidence relative to an alternative method 
of doing the work. 
III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2. 
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 2 is very similar 
to the requested Instruction No. 3. The argument under 
point II is equally applicable to the instruction here con-
sidered. 
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The Appellant has cited the following cases in suppo,rt 
of his contention under Point III. These cases are as fol-
lows: Boston & M. R. R. v. Meech, 1 Cir. 156 F. 2d 109; 
Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 344 U. S. 407, 97 L. 
Ed. 441, 73 Sup. Ct. 358; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Wright, 278 P. 2d 830, (Oklahoma); Huskey 
v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 181 S. W. 1041, 192 Mo. App. 
370; Brown v. Coley, 152 So. 61, 168 Miss. 778; E. J O'Brien 
& Co. v. Shelton's Adm'r., 55 S. W. 2d 352, 246 Ky. 537. 
In the Meech case supra the court did not consider any-
thing more than the sufficiency of the evidence to take the 
case to the jury. The court made general statements 
relative to the duty to provide a safe place to work, which 
are of very little assistance in the instant case. In the Ro·ck 
Island case supra the plaintiff in his pleadings alleged 
negligence in the following particulars: 
1. Failure to provide plaintiff with a safe place to 
work. 
2. Failure to provide a reasonable safe manner or 
plan for doing the work. 
3. Failure to profide adequate tools. 
4. Failure to provide sufficient help. 
Evidence was introduced in support of all the above 
and particularly in support of the allegation that defendant 
did not provide plaintiff with a reasonable safe manner 
or plan for doing the work. In this respect plaintiff pro-
duced evidence showing that the method employed in mov-
ing the rail was improper, and introduced evidence showing 
a proper method of doing the work. The court found suffi-
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cient evidence to support the allegations and submitted the 
case to the jury. The court did not discuss instructions. 
In the Huskey case supra plaintiff introduced evidence 
showing two ways of doing the work, one of which was 
clearly unnecessary and unreasonable. The court, as cited 
at page 27 of Appellant's brief, said : 
"If two ways are open to a person to use, one 
safe and the other dangerous, the choice of the dan-
gerous way with knowledge of the danger constitutes 
negligence." 
In the Huskey case supra there was no discussion of 
instructions. It was again simply a question of whether or 
not there was sufficient evidence to take the case to the 
jury. We believe that the finding of the court was proper, 
but in no \Vay helpful in determining the issues before this 
court. 
In the Brown case supra the plaintiff was a laborer 
who received burns when he poured gasoline from a bucket 
into a small opening in a tank without using a funnel, and 
while the motor was running. The lower court permitted 
the case to go to the jury and the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi reversed holding that there was not sufficient evi-
dence. The court said : 
" 'If the ~vork is simple in character and free 
from complexities, the maste'r is under no obligation 
to adopt rules. In other words, where the danger is 
apparent to all, and the duty of the servants to 
a void such danger is n1anifest, no rules are required.' 
See also, R'eed v. Ridout's Arnbulance, 212 Ala. 428, 
433, 102 So. 906. 
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"The attempt of the servant without the use of 
a funnel to pour gasoline out of a bucket into a small 
hole in the tank, near the electrical equipment of the 
engine while the engine was running was an act 
which, to any sensible, adult person acquainted with 
the volatile and highly inflammatory character of 
gasoline, would be known to be a dangerous method, 
it would be obvious. The servant admits that he 
knew this; and it seems to us that it is such a fact 
as would not involve any complexity or uncertainty 
or obscurity to a person who had ever worked around 
gasoline motors as the servant admits he had done, 
not only in this service but in previous experience. 
Moreover, the handling and use of gasoline have be-
come so general, so much a part of the daily obser-
vation and experience of all adult persons, so much 
a matter of conscious knowledge to all of mature age 
who will open their eyes, that there could be no well 
grounded basis of justice now to hold that its use, 
in the manner shown in this case, involves that 
which is either complex or uncertain or obscure." 
This case in no way supports Appellant's position. If 
anything, it argues against it. 
In the Stone case supra the United States Supreme 
Court by a split court reversed the decision of the Missouri 
Supreme Court which held that there was not sufficient 
evidence of negligence or causation to take the case to the 
jury. The facts were that plaintiff, a section laborer, 
claimed he injured his back while pulling a tie from under 
a rail. Evidence was introduced showing other methods of 
removing the tie and also evidence that at the time plaintiff 
was injured the section foreman urged him to pull harder 
and it was while he was pulling harder that he injured his 
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back. Evidence was also introduced showing that it re-
quired· additional men to finally move the tie. The case 
did not involve an instruction, but again simply involved 
a question of whether or not there was sufficient evidence 
to go to the Jury. The Missouri Supreme Court felt that 
there was not sufficient evidence and three of the United 
States Supreme Court Justices agreed. However, the ma-
jority of the United States Supreme Court Justices agreed 
with Justice Douglas and held that the evidence was suffi-
cient. How this case can possibly assist the court in de-
termining the question involving failure to give certain 
instructions is beyond our comprehension. 
IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT, AS REQUESTED 
BY APPELLANT, THAT AN EMPLOYER IS 
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IF IT EXPOSES 
ITS EMPLOYEE TO AN UNNECESSARY RISK, 
AND THAT SUCH DUTY CANNOT BE DELE-
GATED. 
We clearly understand that an employer has a duty to 
provide employees with a safe place to work, which of 
course, means that the employer should not expose the 
plaintiff to unnecessary risks. Appellant has cited some 
case law wherein courts have held that the evidence intro-
duced 'vas sufficient to permit a jury finding on this issue. 
Such cases do not help in determining whether the court 
erred in failing to give Appellant's requested Instructions 
Nos. 1 to 5. 
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Appellant's requested Instruction No. 1 is in effect 
the same as the court's Instruction No. 12 which is patterned 
after the instruction given in the Bowden case supra, where-
in the court approved an instruction to the effect that the 
employer is not negligent unless he knew or should have 
known that the situation or place where the· employee was 
working exposed the employee to unreasonable risk of harm. 
Unreasonable risk of harm is simply another way of saying 
unnecessary risk. 
As herein stated the requested Instruction No. 2 relates 
to a safe method of doing the work. Appellant claims that 
he was ordered to remove a rock. Defendant denied this 
and produced evidence that Appellant was standing at the 
edge of the rock pile, and was directed to move out of 
I the way. The court in its Instruction No. 12 told the 
jury that if they believed the Appellant's story then the 
Railroad was liable, if the Railroad knew or should have 
known that requiring Appellant to remove a stone, as 
claimed, exposed him to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
An instruction which would permit the jury to spec-
ulate about alternative methods of doing the work would 
have been improper. 
Appellant's requested\ Instruction No. 3 relates to "a 
safe plan of work." The Appellant introduced no evidence 
showing that the plan of work employed by the respondent 
was unreasonable or that some other plan should have been 
adopted. The only evidence in the case, as herein stated, 
was whether the Appellant was moving a rock on direction 
of the roadmaster or was standing on the outside edge of the 
rocks and when directed to move slipped and fell. Permit-
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ting the jury to speculate about "a plan of work," would 
concern the jury with an irrelevant issue without evidence 
upon·which it could make a finding. 
It is true that the respondent introduced some evi-
dence to the effect that the crew were advised when they 
were at the tool house prior to the time they commenced 
the work that they should keep behind the rocks and \Vork 
from the rail outward. The Appellant denied that such a 
conversation took place. 
In Brown v. Coley, supra, cited by Appellant, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court held that "if the work is simple in 
character, the master is under no obligation to adopt rules." 
Certainly moving rocks is simple. Must the railroad devise 
rules and plans for such work, or is it permissible to assume 
that employees are able to do such tasks on their own? 
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 4 relates to safe 
and efficient tools. No evidence was introduced which in 
any way indicated that the Appellant was not supplied with 
such tools. The only evidence on this question relates to 
a bar which was supplied to the Appellant and which Appel-
lant testified he laid on the ground prior to the time he 
reached for a stone as directed by the roadmaster. The 
Appellant introduced no evidence showing that a bar was 
not a proper tool, and introduced no evidence showing that 
other tools would have been proper under the circumstances. 
To permit the jury to speculate without evidence on this 
issue· would have been error. 
We have· considered Appellant's requested Instruction 
No. 4 because Appellant has discussed it in his brief. 
Actually it is not properly before the court. The Appellant 
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took no exception to the court's failure to give it at the 
time he took his exception to the court's instructions. 
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 5 states that the 
Respondent had a "duty not to expose them [Appellant] to 
any unnecessary or unreasonable risks." The only unnec-
essary or unreasonable risk claimed by the Appellant in this 
case was the risk imposed upon him when he was allegedly 
. ordered to move a stone which had become lodged. While 
doing so he allegedly caused the other stones to become loose. 
The court instructed on this evidence and stated in effect 
that if the roadmaster so ordered the Appellant to move a 
stone and if at said time the roadmaster knew or should 
have known that this would expose the Appellant to an un-
reasonable risk of harm, then the Railroad would be negli-
gent and liable to the Appellant. We submit that the court's 
instruction was proper and that an instruction relating gen-
erally to unnecessary risk which was not applicable to evi-
dence introduced in the case, would permit the jury to spec-
ulate and would have been improper. 
v. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCT·, AS REQUESTED 
BY APPELLANT, THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID 
NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF HIS EMPLOY-
MENT AND THAT HE WAS NOT NEGLIGENT 
IN CONTINUING TO WORK KNOWING THAT 
HE WAS REQUIRED TO WORK IN A DAN-
GEROUS OR UNSAFE PLACE. 
We believe the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case 
of Alfred Roger Moore v. The Denver and Rio Grande 
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Western Railroad Company, No. 8284, (not yet reported) 
clearly answered Appellant's objection wherein the court 
said: 
"Two instructions, requested by respondent~ 
were given the jury, although they are outside the 
issues of the trial. There is no question but that 
the statements of law contained in each were cor-
rect, but this court has held that where the instruc-
tion is extraneous to the issues and evidence of the 
case, it is error for the trial court to give it. Parker 
v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425. 
* * * * 
"The Bruner case also discussed an instruction 
of the same import as Instruction No. 13 in the 
present case: 
" 'The Federal Employers' Liability Act 
provides as follows : 
" 'That in any action brought against any 
common carrier under or by virtue of any of 
the provisions of this chapter to recover dam-
ages for injuries to * * * any of its em-
ployees, such employee shall not be held to have 
assumed the risks of his employment in any 
case where such injury * * * resulted in 
whole or in part from the negligence of any of 
the officers, agents or employees of such car-
rier * * * ' 
"In the present case, as in the Bruner case, no 
issue of assumption of risk '""as raised by the plead-
ings or the evidence and no good purpose could have 
been served by the giving of such an instruction." 
As in the Moore case supra, no issue of assumption of 
risk was pled or \Vas evidence relating thereto introduced. 
Furthermore, the court clearly advised the jury that if plain-
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tiff was injured as he claimed the defendant was liable· if 
the defendant knew or should have known that' defendant's 
conduct placed plaintiff in a position where he would be 
exposed to unreasonable risk of harm. 
VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS NOS. 13 AND 14. 
We note before making argument hereunder that Ap-
pellant did not except to the court's failure to give Instruc-
tion No. 14. We, however, desire to make no point of this 
as both Instruction Nos. 13 and 14 relate to the same sub-
ject matter. 
The theory of the two requested instructions is that 
(1) the jury could find that the defendant through its 
roadmaster gave an order in English which the plaintiff 
misunderstood and that because of this misunderstanding 
plaintiff was injured, and (2) that failure to give the order 
in Mexican or in some other manner constituted negligence. 
We submit that so far as ( 1) above is concerned there 
is no evidence from which the jury could find that plaintiff 
misunderstood an order resulting in his injuries. This is 
apparent from the testimony of plaintiff himself. The 
following statements from the record are pertinent : 
"Q. Now how did the roadmaster tell you to 
roll the stones ? 
"A. Told us to take the bars. 
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"Q. How did he say to take the bars, in Span-
"A. No, in English. 
"Q. And did you understand, 'take the bOJrs'? 
"A. Yes, 'bar' is similar to Spanish 'bara'. 
"Q. And what did they do then? 
"A. We began to roll the stones (R. 19). 
* * * * 
"A. When I was told to roll stones, that is 
where I was, in this position, rolling with the bar. 
"Q. 'Vho told you to roll the stones? 
''A. The road master. 
"Q. How did he teU you to· roll the stones? 
"A. With the bar (R. 22). 
* * * * 
"A. When the road master told us to roll the 
stones in there, dislodging one, another one rolled 
and hit me in the back and knocked me to the spot 
(R. 23). 
* * * * 
"A. The roadmaster made the sign, the motion 
to me, with his hand, to keep on rolling the stows. 
I laid my bar down, because one of the stones would 
not be rolled, so I seized it 'vith my hands to pull it; 
when I pulled it with my hand, the other one became 
dislodged and hit me. 
"After the roadmaster made this motion to me 
to roll the stones, I rolled it; the other one became 
dislodged and hit me, and that is when I fell to this 
spot I have indicated (R. 24). 
* * * * 
"Q. (Mr. Patterson) How long did you con· 
tinue to roll the rocks at the top of the pile? 
"A. About 20 minutes. 
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"Q. Then what happened? 
"A. Then the roadmaster motioned for me to 
keep pushing the stones (R. 44). 
* * * * 
"Q. Why had you gone from the top of the 
pile down to this place on the bottom of the pile? 
"A. Because the roadmaster said to roll the 
stones. 
"Q. Then when you got to the bottom of the 
pile, what did you do? 
"A. Then I turned the stone over. 
"Q. And then what did you do? 
"A. When I rolled that stone away, another 
one hit me in the back" (R. 45). 
lVIr. Charlevois' testimony was as follows: 
"A. I noticed that Mr. Arellano, as he started 
to move these rocks, to remove these rocks-he was 
very unsteady on his feet, and I told him to get out 
of the way before he got hurt. V/hat I meant for 
him to do was to step off to the side there, and let 
these other fellows get the rocks out of the way. 
"I was quite certain that the man would fall 
down if he tried to maintain his footing on these 
rocks. 
"Q. What did you observe after you told him 
to get out of the way, as to what he did and where 
he went? 
"A. Instead of getting out of the way, the man 
walked out on the edge of the fill-walked out this 
way-and walked east on the edge of the pile of 
rock there, and he stumbled here, and turned almost 
completely around, and fell down into the ditch here. 
* * * * 
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"Q. (Mr. Lewis) At the time that you say 
Mr. P~rellano lost his footing and fell in the ditch, 
was he engaged in the process of attempting to move 
a rock or rocks? 
"A. No" (R. 140). 
If the jury believed Mr. Arellano's testimony they could 
not believe Char levois. The two stories are incompatable. 
The jury could not have found from the evidence that when 
Mr. Arellano was removing a rock he thought he was doing 
so because of an order from the roadmaster. So far as the 
evidence is concerned Mr. Charlevois gave an order to move 
the rocks or he did not. Furthermore he told Appellant to 
move out of the way or he did not. For the jury to find 
that he did what he did because of misunderstanding would 
be to invite speculation. The evidence offers no basis for 
such a finding. 
Even if it be assumed that Arellano misunderstood 
because the roadmaster did not give the order in Mexican, 
such fact would not show negligence. Surely a master who 
sees someone in a position of peril is not negligent because 
he is unable to speak a foreign tongue and shouts a warn-
ing or gives an order in English. Surely, he need not stand 
in silence in such a situation until an interpreter appears. 
In any event the Appellant has cited no cases so holding. 
The cases which are cited seen1 to us to have no bearing on 
the problem here considered. 
In Leonidas v. Great Northe·rn Ry. Co., 72 P. 2d 1007, 
105 Mont. 302, the facts are in no way analagous. There 
was no evidence of misunderstanding. The court, in dealing 
with another point, stated a general rule relative to obed-
ience to a master's order. 
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In Grant Storage Battery Co. v. De Lay, 87 F. 2d 726, 
the question related to the duty of a master to caution an 
employee about a hidden danger. (In this case a condition 
which would cause lead poisoning.) The court announced 
a general rule, quoted by Appellant, with '\Vhich we do not 
disagree. It, however, has no application to the problem 
here. 
In Pullman Co. v. Ranshaw, 203 S. W. 122, (Texas 
App.), the question was whether pleadings were sufficient. 
Plaintiff alleged he was ordered by the defendant company 
to remain on a pullman car, and that without his knowledge 
the defendant company employed two immature Mexicans, 
who could not speak English, and that these watclunen shot 
him while in the process of removing him from the car. 
The court, understandably, held that a cause of action was 
stated. 
In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Iron & Wire Works, 
129 N. W. 615, 145 Wis. 385 (1911), one of defendant's 
tanks contained a sol uti on of cyanide of potassi urn. Also 
near the tank was a hose containing water from which 
employees were in the habit of obtaining a drink. The de-
fendant's superintendent placed the hose in the tank for the 
purpose of syphoning off the solution. The court held that 
an instruction allegedly given by the master could have been 
misleading to plaintiff's decedent who went into the base-
ment and drank the water. The court said: 
"This is not the case of a master instructing his 
employees concerning the dangers, attendant upon 
work to be done by the latter. What would be a suf-
ficient warning in that case might not be a suffi-
cient warning in a case like this." 
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In Richard v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 109 Atl. 88, 79 N.H. 
380,. and Upton v. Conway Lumber Co., 128 Atl. 802, 81 N. 
H. 489, the facts are in no way analagous, nor is there any 
point in disagreeing with the general principles of law 
announced therein. The same is true of Sadler v. Lynch,, 
64 S. E. 2d 669, 192 Va. 257, and In Re Panasuk~ 105 N. E. 
368, (Mass.) . 
The other authorities taken from texts and particularly 
from "Naval Leadership" (a text of the U. S. Naval Acad-
emy) , are interesting but of very little help in determining 
the question raised in Appellant's brief. 
VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL BY 
REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF A JUROR. 
The trial court had before it the affidavits filed by 
Appellant and observed the conduct of the witness Garcia 
who testified at the special hearing relative to the alleged 
misconduct and summarily held that no evidence was pro-
duced which indicated misconduct. 
We submit that a reading of the affidavits filed by 
Appellant and the examination of the testimony given by 
Garcia will quickly convince the court that the suspicions 
apparently existing in Appellant's mind about the supposed 
misconduct of a juror are entirely unfounded, and unjusti-
fied. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Appellant in this case 
has had a fair trial by a jury selected to try his case, and 
that the verdict returned is in all respects a fair and proper 
one and that the instructions given by the court fairly and 
properly advised the jury relative to the law applicable to 
the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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